Boko Haram, ISIS, Fulani – who poses the greatest threat in Nigeria today?
Just over a decade ago, terrorism in many African countries was largely a local phenomenon. Today, it is one of the main factors destabilizing entire states in the Maghreb and Sahel regions, directly affecting more than half a billion people. It is also hard to ignore that this phenomenon is closely linked to growing Islamic fundamentalism. Over the years, it has become increasingly clear just how rapidly it spreads and adapts.
It is difficult to pinpoint a single moment from which the rapid proliferation of groups treating terror as their primary tool for achieving their goals began. Some point to the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, others to the latter years of the Soviet-Afghan War and the emergence of Al-Qaeda in the late 1980s. The events of the Arab Spring also played a significant role. The collapse and destabilization of states such as Libya and Syria created space for the expansion of terrorist organizations like ISIS and Al-Qaeda.
Regardless of which of these factors we consider the turning point, contemporary jihadism has a global reach, and Africa has become one of the main theatres of its bloodiest episodes. This is clearly evident in Nigeria, where the security situation deteriorates further year after year. It has even come to the point where jihadist groups have begun fighting one another for influence and control over territory. I would be far from calling this a cause for satisfaction, however. As in every war, those who have nothing to do with it suffer the most – the people living at the very epicentre of events.
For some time now, Nigeria has been appearing in the Polish media landscape. Tens of thousands of people killed and injured every year cannot go unnoticed. However, media coverage is usually limited to reporting the death toll from a major attack, a brief quote from a local human rights activist or a representative of the local authorities, or a passage cited from a UN or Amnesty International report. What is lacking is an explanation of why Nigeria has for years ranked among the countries most threatened by terrorism. Often, there is no information about the perpetrators or their motives either.
For over two years we have been helping the victims of terror in Nigeria, and I believe that through our work, many people have for the first time learned about the problem faced by the inhabitants of this country. It is therefore worth saying a little more about the groups that pose the greatest threat not only in Nigeria, but across the entire Sahel region.
Western education is a sin – Boko Haram
Probably the best-known terrorist organization in Nigeria is Boko Haram, founded in 2002 by Mohammed Yusuf in Maiduguri, in the north-east of the country. Initially, it was “merely” a local religious movement, sometimes described as a sect, centred around a local Salafist mosque. The name Boko Haram is most commonly translated as “Western education is a sin,” which largely captures the group’s ideological foundation: opposition to Western influences and the established education system, which its members considered corrupting and alien to Muslim values. Initially, the group attracted young people disillusioned with corruption, poverty, and the marginalization of northern Nigeria. It created closed communities and gradually radicalized its followers. A few years after its founding, the first clashes with security forces took place, but the authorities long downplayed the threat and reports of training camps being established by Boko Haram. Yusuf’s influence was growing and his sermons were widely disseminated, including through television broadcasts, reaching an ever wider audience.
The breakthrough came in 2009. After a series of riots and clashes with the police, Mohammed Yusuf was detained and then killed by the Nigerian security services. That event marked a radical turning point. Leadership was taken over by Yusuf’s former deputy, Abubakar Shekau, who transformed Boko Haram into a brutal armed organization. A bloody campaign began targeting both state structures and civilians. Churches, schools, government offices, international institutions, and police and military posts became targets. The victims were Christians, against whom the fanatics declared open war, but also Muslims deemed “not sufficiently committed” to overthrowing the established public order.
In the following years, Boko Haram also expanded its areas of activity to other provinces, and even beyond the borders of Nigeria, attacking in Niger, Cameroon, and Chad. The organization forged international links — first turning to Al-Qaeda for support, and then in 2015 Shekau pledged allegiance to the so-called Islamic State (ISIS). However, this alliance did not last long.
Since 2009, Boko Haram has carried out hundreds of attacks. It is estimated that at least 35,000 people have been their direct victims. When deaths resulting from injuries sustained in the attacks, hunger, disease, and the general breakdown of state structures are also taken into account, this number rises to as many as 300,000. Additionally, more than two million people have been forced to flee their homes. In just over a decade since its founding, the organization has gone from a local religious movement to one of the bloodiest terrorist groups in the world.
Since around 2021, Boko Haram’s classic structure started to lose its meaning. It is not however an effect of successful actions of the army or the state, but a result of internal divisions and a conflict with the new dominant fraction: the Islamic State – West Africa Province (ISWAP). As a result of conflict between the two groups in 2021, Abubakar Shekau was killed after detonating an explosive device to avoid being captured. Some militants surrendered; others joined ISWAP. But violence did not disappear – only its main perpetrator changed.
Middle Eastern fundamentalism in Nigerian form – ISWAP
The Islamic State – West Africa Province (ISWAP) is often confused with Boko Haram. Many terrorist attacks are attributed to either of the two organizations, even though they do not always take responsibility for these attacks. Taking into account that for a while these groups acted under the same banner, while ISWAP was an offshoot of Boko Haram, the confusion should not surprise anyone. The situation is additionally complicated by smaller factions cooperating with one side or the either, making verification even more difficult. That is why it is worth explaining why ISIS – associated mainly with rebellion in Iraq and Syria – appeared in Nigeria as well.
The death of Abubakar Shekau, who served as the leader of Boko Haram for many years, did not mean the end of bloodshed. Quite the opposite – it proved that the conflict entered a new phase. In order to understand how this new threat emerged, we need to go back to 2015, when Boko Haram pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (ISIS). At the time when ISIS controlled vast territories of Iraq and Syria, it was building a global network of “provinces” which were to become a part of announced caliphate. Nigeria became one of the flashpoints on the map. It didn’t mean, however, that emissaries from Mosul or Raqqa arrived in Western Africa to build a new structure. ISWAP emerged from Boko Haram. Initially, the organization accepted the leadership of ISIS, but it soon became clear that Shekau was not going to submit to external instructions.
ISIS leadership criticized his brutality towards Muslim civilian population and the way of fighting, which instead of building public support deepened the group’s isolation. In 2016, a new leader was announced: Abu Musab al-Barnawi, the son of Mohammed Yusuf. Some militants accepted it and adopted new name – ISWAP. The rest remained loyal to Shekau.
That is how two rivalry fractions were born. One was acting chaotically and ruthlessly, while the other began building a more organized structure, focusing on attacks on the army, the administration, and on gaining control over territory around the Lake Chad. The conflict between them lasted for a few years and ended in 2021 with the death of Shekau. From that moment, ISWAP became a dominant jihadist force in north-eastern Nigeria.
It is worth adding that ISWAP is not a group of bandits hiding in the forest, but an increasingly well-functioning structure with quasi-state ambitions. It collects taxes, establishes courts to resolve disputes, and administers punishments on territories it controls. At the same time, it carries out propaganda activities, building wells, makeshift medical points, and creates social safety net for the militants’ families. This way, it attempts to gain acceptance from the population that perceived its “order” as less corrupt and more predictable than the state system.
However, this does not equal to stabilization. Everyone who is suspected of working with the government, who avoids paying taxes, or who in any way objects to the group’s rule, may be subject to brutal repressions or killed. On territories with ISWAP activities, Christian minority is constantly persecuted, while the level of violence and a number of terrorist attacks remains very high.
Smaller fractions, greater chaos
Although Boko Haram and ISWAP dominate media coverage, they are not the only groups destabilizing Nigeria. In the shadow of these two organizations, smaller and often lesser-known structures operate, further complicating the picture of the conflict. One of them is Lakurawa – a small but increasingly noted group operating mainly in north-west Nigeria, in areas bordering Niger. Its members adhere to a radical Salafi ideology and, according to some sources, maintain contacts with groups linked to Al-Qaeda in the Sahel region. Interestingly, Lakurawa was established as a self-defence formation meant to counter local gangs. Over time, however, it began to grow and radicalize rapidly, and as a result became a bigger problem than the bandits themselves. The scale of its activities remains limited, but the mere presence of yet another armed actor shows that the security landscape in Nigeria is becoming increasingly fragmented.
Al-Qaeda’s influence in West Africa is in fact wider and extends beyond individual structures. Although Nigeria has not become the main bastion of this organization – unlike Mali or Burkina Faso – the ideological and operational reach of its affiliated networks remains noticeable, especially in border areas.
A separate phenomenon is the so-called ‘bandits’ – armed gangs operating mainly in the north-western states of Nigeria. Unlike jihadist structures, their motivation is largely criminal in nature: kidnappings for ransom, looting, and extortion. Over time, however, the line between criminality and ideologically motivated terrorism has begun to blur. Some gangs form tactical alliances with Islamist groups, making use of their logistical support, weapons exchanges, or protection. As a result, the conflict is becoming a mix of extremism, criminality, and local disputes over land and power. It is within this dense web of dependencies, rivalries, and ad hoc alliances that another dimension of violence is beginning to take shape – one linked to ethnic tensions and conflict surrounding the Fulani community.
Fulani – from conflict over land to organized violence
For years, violence in central Nigeria has been described as a conflict between herders and farmers. This narrative still dominates in much of the foreign media, oversimplifying a complex reality to a mere dispute over water and pastureland. The reality, however, is far more brutal.
The Fulani are one of the largest communities in West Africa, traditionally associated with herding and seasonal cattle migrations. For decades, tensions between nomadic herders and settled farmers were resolved locally – through negotiations, compensation, and traditional mediation mechanisms. However, population growth, the influx of illegal weapons following the collapse of Libya, and the weakness of state institutions have caused the old conflict over resources to spiral out of control. In some regions, especially Plateau and Benue states, violence has gone beyond incidental clashes and increasingly takes the form of planned attacks on entire villages. The victims are predominantly Christian communities, which gives the conflict a distinct religious dimension.
There is no single centralized organization representing all Fulani. There are, however, armed groups rooted in herding communities, sometimes collectively referred to as the ‘Fulani militia.’ Some operate opportunistically and criminally, while others show signs of better organization and coordination. In some cases, the attacks are systematic, involving the burning of villages, mass killings, and forced displacement. Local communities repeatedly point to the passivity and sometimes inexplicable decisions of the security services in the lead-up to attacks. A low level of trust in state institutions further deepens the sense of impunity among the perpetrators and abandonment among the victims. Time and again, the only ones trying to protect Christian civilians have been the so-called ‘Hunters’ — huntsmen drawn from local hunting associations. Their original task was to protect Nigeria’s forests and natural resources. Today, they are the last line of defence for hundreds of villages exposed to attack.
Today, it is increasingly difficult to speak of this solely as a conflict between herders and farmers. In many places, it has transformed into a spiral of violence with ethnic, religious, and political dimensions – the effects of which are just as destructive as the activities of jihadist groups in the north-east of the country. If the criminal activities of the Fulani militia are not swiftly stopped, they may soon find themselves among the most dangerous terrorist organizations in the world.